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INTERPLEADER-MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS PROP-
ERLY DENIED-FINDINGS OF FACT NECESSARY BEFORE DISMISS-
AL OF CLAIM-E. G. Vanatta vs. Grant McFerson, as State Bank
Examiner of the State of Colorado in charge of the Yampa Valley
Bank; The Board of County Commissioners of Lake County,
Colorado, and John Dubovsky, Intervener-No. 13594-Decided
November 18, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
One John Dubovsky deposited money in Yampa Valley Bank and
received time certificate No. 3513. He lost that certificate and the bank,
in lieu thereof, issued certificate No. 4012 to one Katie Dubovsky for
$1,500. John Dubovsky was in financial difficulties and the bank offi-
cer suggested that the new certificate be issued in the name of his sister.
The bank became insolvent and was placed in the hands of the Bank
Commissioner for liquidation.
County Commissioners of Lake County filed claim with the Bank
Commissioner on a judgment obtained against John Dubovsky. Van-
atta, as assignee of Katie Dubovsky, also filed a claim with the Bank
Commissioner.
Then the Bank Commissioner filed his complaint in interpleader
and asked permission to pay the money represented by the certificate into
the registry of the court and be discharged.
County Commissioners filed answer, setting up estoppel, based on
its judgment against John Dubovsky and claimed the District Court
was without jurisdiction. To that answer Vanatta filed a demurrer,
which was sustained. Judgment in interpleader was entered, the Bank
Commissioner directed to pay the money into the registry of the court
and then the County Commissioners filed an amended answer and cross-
complaint against Vanatta. Vanatta also filed an answer and cross-
complaint against the County Commissioners, to which the commission-
ers demurred. Vanatta then moved for judgment on the pleadings,
which motion was overruled and his claim dismissed.
John Dubovsky intervened, alleging that the certificate held by his
sister belonged to him and that his sister had no interest in it whatso-
ever aAd prayed that the court order the money represented by the cer-
tificate, subject to the equity of the County Commissioners, be paid to
him.
Held-That the motion for judgment on the pleadings was prop-
erly overruled but Vanatta's claim was erroneously dismissed. The cer-
tificate stood in the name of Katie Dubovsky, assignee of Vanatta, but it
is alleged that she had no interest in and to the certificate, which was
merely taken in her name for purposes of concealment and hindrance of
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John's creditors. This presents an issue upon which a determination is
to be had of the facts. The claim should be restated and further pro-
ceedings had to determine the facts.
AUTOMOBILES--SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE UNDER GUEST STATUTE
-Schlessinger vs. Gertrude Miller by Her Next Friend Sam Miller
-No. 13612-Decided November 18, 1935--Opinion by Mr.
Justice Burke.
Plaintiff, riding in the back seat of an automobile as a guest of the
defendant, sustained personal injuries in an automobile accident and
brought suit to recover damages. Testimony showed that the defendant
was driving between 40 and 45 miles per hour on one of the principal
streets in Denver, Colorado, at about 11:00 or 11:30 P. M.; that the
defendant was driving with his left hand, his right- arm about his girl
companion in the front seat and was in the act of kissing the girl "a
split second before accident occurred." Prior to accident, the defendant
had been warned repeatedly by his passengers of the danger incurred by
his conduct, but he "just laughed." Verdict and judgment for the
plaintiff in the sum of $2,000.
Held, Affirmed-The evidence justified a finding that the defend-
ant was guilty of negligence, consisting of a "willful and wanton disre-
gard of the rights" of the plaintiff. The court points out that when
one is too intoxicated to drive safely, "puts himself at the wheel," and
"takes the road," he is guilty of "willful and wanton disregard of the
rights of all persons" regardless of the guest statute concerning intoxica-
tion; that "The common knowledge and experience of mankind makes
this language equally applicable to one so intoxicated with love-making
as to drive with one hand at an excessive rate of speed on a thoroughfare
and greet repeated warnings with indifference and laughter."
CONTRACTS - TORTS -ELECTION BETWEEN Two INCONSISTENT
REMEDIES-DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE OF TORT ACTION
BARS ACTION ON CONTRACT SAME TRANSACTION-Florence G.
Wheeler vs. Frank J. Wilkins-No. 13634-Decided November
18, 1935-Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Plaintiff filed an action to recover on an alleged fraudulent stock
selling deal. Defendant's demurrer to the complaint was sustained and
plaintiff filed an amendment to her complaint to which defendant moved
to strike on the grounds that plaintiff had changed her cause of action
from tort to contract. Motion granted and the action dismissed without
prejudice. The plaintiff did not seek a review of that judgment, but in
about ten days started a new suit based on the promise of the defendant
to refund the money paid for the worthless stock. The defendant set
up several defenses, including a general denial, statute of limitations,
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election of remedies, etc. At the close of plaintiff's case, the court
granted the defendant's motion for a non-suit.
Held, Affirmed-The original action in tort was dismissed without
prejudice and, since plaintiff failed to have that judgment reviewed, the
matters there involved became res adjudicata. Plaintiff's election to sue
in tort is irrevocable and a bar to the present suit on an alleged contract.
Mr. Chief Justice Butler, Mr. Justice Burke and Mr. Justice Bouck
vigorously dissent. Mr. Chief Justice Butler and Mr. Justice Bouck
rendered written dissenting opinions.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CHAPTER 118,
SESSION LAWS OF COLORADO, 1933-No. 13787-Decided No-
vember 18, 1935-Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
This is an original proceeding before the Colorado Supreme Court
wherein Governor Edwin C. Johnson, pursuant to authority contained
in Section 3, Article 6, of the Constitution, submitted six interrogatories
to the Supreme Court relative to the constitutionality of Chapter 118,
Session Laws of Colorado, 1933, which, among other things, provides
for regulations, restrictions and conditions under which food may be
prepared and sold for human consumption.
Certain merchants of Colorado claimed that the act in question
contravened their constitutional rights to conduct restaurants and prior
to the effective date of the statute filed their bill of complaint in the
United States District Court of Colorado against the Governor and
Attorney General and the State Board of Health seeking to enjoin the
enforcement of the statute. A three-judge Federal court was convened
to consider the matter. After a hearing, the court issued its restraining
order, by a decision of two to one; Judge J. Foster Symes, one of the
three judges, opposed the restraining order. Then the Governor of the
State of Colorado submitted his interrogatories to the Supreme Court
of the State of Colorado.
Held-The statute is constitutional. It is the expression of the
representative branch of the government which has authority to deter-
mine what is requisite to promote and preserve health, safety and morals.
The sovereign, under its police powers, may fairly and reasonably restrict
the use of property. The unrestricted privilege to engage in business or
to conduct it as one pleases is not guaranteed by the Constitution.
Mr. Justice Burke and Mr. Justice Holland dissent.
FALSE IMPRISONMENT-PHYSICAL FORCE NOT NECESSARY-The
Crew-Beggs Dry Goods Company, a Corporation vs. Lea Bayle-
No. 13601-Decided November 12, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Jus-
tice Holland.
Plaintiff sued the defendant (plaintiff in error) for damages on
account of false imprisonment. Plaintiff claimed that she was in de-
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fendant's department store as a customer when an employee of the
defendant stopped her and charged that plaintiff was a shoplifter. Ver-
dict and judgment for plaintiff.
Errors assigned: (1) Overruling demurrer to complaint; (2)
overruling demurrer to evidence at close of plaintiff's case; (3) denial
of motion for a directed verdict.
Held, Affirmed-Physical force not required to complete a false
imprisonment; any restraint, either by force or fear, without justifica-
tion, is sufficient.
AUTOMOBILES-PROXIMATE CAUSE-EXCESSIVE DAMAGES-NEGLI-
GENCE OF DRIVER NOT IMPUTED TO THE PASSENGER-VERDICT
ON CONFLICTING EVIDENCE NOT DISTURBED--Fred Knaus vs.
Lois Yoder, by Fred Yoder and Grace Yoder, as Her Father and
Mother and Next Friends Herein-No. 13613-Decided Novem-
ber 12, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Plaintiff sued the defendant (plaintiff in error) to recover damages
for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident. The auto-
mobile in which the plaintiff was riding, travelling west, was struck by
the defendant's automobile east of the intersection of a north and south
street. The defendant had been travelling north but made a wide right
turn to go east just before the accident occurred. Evidence was conflict-
ing as to whether or not the collision occurred on plaintiff's or defend-
ant's side of the street.
Plaintiff's injuries consisted of nervous shock, lacerations of the
face, permanent disfigurement, broken nose with permanent injury to
nasal passages and likely to become worse. Verdict and judgment for
plaintiff in sum of $8,750.
Errors assigned: (1) Erroneous instructions, and (2) excessive
damages.
Held, Affirmed-Proximate cause of the accident on conflicting
evidence is for the jury. Amount of compensation to be awarded for
such serious injuries also for the jury; the amount awarded does not
reflect prejudice or corruption on the part of the jury. Negligence of
driver not imputed to the plaintiff who was a passenger. Mr. Justice
Bouck dissents.
MINES--CONFLICTING CLAIMS-LANDLORD AND TENANT-Kenney
vs. Eccer-No. 13615-Decided November 4, 1935--Opinion
by Mr. Justice Campbell.
This is a controversy between the parties concerning the ownership
of certain mining claims, particularly over conflicting locations. The
trial court in its findings held that the only question in controversy was
whether the defendants were estopped from claiming the right to loca-
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tion as against the plaintiffs by reason of an alleged relationship as land-
lord and tenant. The trial court held for the plaintiffs:
1. Where there is a conflict as to priority of mining location
the defense that the relation of landlord and tenant existed at the time
the tenant made an adverse location is.good, provided the evidence shows
that the relation of landlord and tenant existed.
2. There was competent evidence to sustain the finding of the
trial court that the relation of landlord and tenant did not exist.
3. There was competent evidence to prove that the defendants
located the mining claim before the relation of landlord and tenant came
into existence and hence they are not estopped.
4. Evidence examined and sufficient to sustain the judgment of
the lower court.--Judgment affirmed.
INSURANCE-FIDELITY BOND-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE TO RE-
COVER ON-MOTION FOR NON-SUIT-American Surety Com-
pany vs. Capitol Building and Loan Association-No. 13479-
Decided October 21, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
The Capitol Company sued the Insurance Company below upon
a fidelity bond, claiming that an employee had embezzled monies. De-
fendant made motion for non-suit below, which was denied and defend-
ant stood on the motion and judgment was entered for plaintiff.
1. The motion for non-suit should have been granted.
2. The plaintiff failed to establish the alleged cause of action.
3. Where a fidelity bond provides for liability through any dis-
honest act of the employee, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff seeking to
recover to show that a loss occurred through a dishonest act.
4. The evidence wholly failed to show such.
5. Mere negligence producing a loss will not establish liability
under the bond.-Judgment reversed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-REOPENING CASE ON COMMISSION'S
OWN MOTION AND AWARDING ADDITIONAL BENEFITS-FIND-
INGS OF COMMISSION CONCLUSIVE ON CONFLICTING EVIDENCE
-- SUPREME COURT RULE 32-Moffat Coal Company and the
Employer's Mutual Insurance Company vs. Pete Cometa and The
Industrial Commission of Colorado-No. 13827-Decided No-
vember 12, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
Employee injured in an accident arising out of and within the
scope of his employment awarded 15% permanent partial disability
benefits. Later the case was reopened on the Commission's own motion
and disability benefits increased to 20%. Still later the Commission
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again reopened the case, took additional testimony and on the grounds
of changed conditions increased disability benefits to 25 %.
Held, Affirmed-The evidence is conflicting and the Commission's
findings are sufficient and conclusive. The court directs attention to
Supreme Court Rule 32 to effect that each alleged "error should be
separately alleged and particularly specified."
AUTOMOBILE-MANSLAUGHTER---CAUSING DEATH WHILE UNDER
INFLUENCE OF INTOXICANTS--Stevens vs. People-No. 13761
-Decided November 4, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice
Butler.
Stevens was convicted under Chapter 95, Session Laws of 1923, of
causing death of another while driving an automobile under the influ-
ence of intoxicating liquor.
1. The word "intoxicated" in title is synonymous with the
words "under the influence of intoxicating liquor" as Used in body of
act.
2. Hence, the title covers the body of the act.
3. Evidence sufficient to support verdict.
4. Not improper to show that defendant ran away and ren-
dered no assistance to the injured.
5. Experiment made after the accident, made under like condi-
tion, admissible.
6. Proper to show that defendant's attorney tried to change testi-
mony of defendant by making improper suggestions in regard to not
drinking.
7. Rejection of certain evidence was proper.---Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Bouck dissents.
INSURANCE-CONTRACTORS BOND-EVIDENCE-MOTION TO STRIKE
-ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS--TRUSTS--Ohio Casualty Company
vs. Colorado. Portland Cement Company-No. 13505-Decided
November 4, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
The Cement Company recovered judgment below against the in-
surance company upon a bond given by a contractor to pay for materials
used on highway construction contract, the contractor having defaulted
in payment.
1. It was proper to strike from the answer portions of applica-
tion where the bond itself provided that the application was no part of
the bond.
2. It was proper to strike from the answer all reference to other
contracts and bonds not involved herein.
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3. An assignment of error that "the judgment is contrary to and
against the evidence and the law applicable thereto" is not a proper one
and does not comply with Rule 32, which requires the specific assign-
ment of each error.
4. The bank account of the. contractor was his property, not
subject to any trust.--Judgment affirmed.
INSURANCE-ACCIDENT POLICY-OCCUPATIONAL DUTIES-EXCES-
SIVE VERDICT-INSTRUCTIONS--Federal Life Insurance Com-
pany vs. Lorton-No. 13604-Decided November 4, 1935-
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Butler.
Lorton, as administrator, recovered $1,400 for death of one Busby
on accident policy which provided against liability if death occurred
while performing occupational duties.
Deceased was killed in wrecking a building on a ranch. He was
only employed as a ranch hand to feed cattle and do chores.
1. Deceased was not engaged in an occupational duty when he
was killed.
2. Instructions not set forth in abstract of record will -not be
considered.
3. Verdict is not excessive. While the policy was for $1,000
face, still it provided for an increase of 10% each additional year after
the first year and the evidence shows it had been in force for four suc-
cessive years; hence $1,400 was the proper measure of liability.--Judg-
ment affirmed.
MURDER-ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT-SUFFICIENCY OF EVI-
DENCE-Howard vs. The People-No. 13755-Decided Novem-
ber 4, 1935-Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Butter.
Howard was convicted of being an accessory after the fact to the
murder of Charles Rubin by Sam Jones. He seeks a reversal of the
sentence.
1. Under the Colorado statute, a person can be prosecuted as an
accessory after the fact even before the principal has been convicted.
2. It is no defense to charge of being accessory after the fact in a
murder case that the murderer himself had not been formally charged
with the murder.
3. The findings of the court were amply supported by the evi-
dence.
4. Where one is charged with murder and is acquitted, such ac-
quittal does not bar a prosecution against him as accessory after the fact.
-- Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Hilliard dissents.
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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE - ACCI-
DENTAL INJURY-USING DOPE ON AEROPLANE-Industrial
Commission of Colorado et al. vs. Ule-No. 13668-Decided
August 19, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Butler.
Ule was employed as a woodworker at Denver Municipal Airport.
He worked principally in the dope shed where dope was applied to
bodies and wings of aeroplanes by means of a spray gun. At various
times he showed evidence of dope poisoning which did not interfere
with his work, but at one time he was subjected to an unusual and
excessive exposure from the dope due to use on a hurry-up job from
the effects of which he died.
The Commission held that the death was not due to accident but
to occupational disease and on appeal to the District Court the District
Court vacated the award and remanded the case to the Commission with
directions to enter an award.
1. An occupational disease is one contracted in the usual and
ordinary course of events, which from the common experience of human-
ity is known to be incident to a particular employment.
2. The evidence shows that the serious disability which resulted
in claimant's death was not the natural and reasonably to be expected
result of his employment; nor that his disease was contracted in the
usual course of events. The exposures the claimant was subjected to
were double those previously used and produced effects that were not
intended, foreseen or expected, and hence it was an accident.-Judgment
affirmed.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-CONTRIBUTION BETWEEN PARTNERS-
FOREIGN JUDGMENT-Davison et al. vs. Tucker-No. 13548-
Decided October 7, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Plaintiffs below contend that this is an action for contribution
between partners, while defendant insists that it is an action on a for-
eign judgment and is barred by the statute of limitations. The trial
court adopted the latter view.
1. Where the action is brought by partners for contribution
against another partner on a foreign judgment that the plaintiffs have
been compelled to pay, the action is one for contribution and is not an
action upon a foreign judgment.
2. Hence, the statute of limitations with reference to bringing
suit upon a foreign judgment does not apply.--Judgment reversed.
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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE-MINIMUM
-- COMPENSATION-Roeder as Trustee vs. The Industrial Com-
mission-No. 13739-Decided June 17, 1935-Opinion by Mr.
Justice Burke.
Claimant, while employed by the company, was injured in an
accident arising out of and in the course of that employment, and
was totally disabled for approximately seventeen weeks. At the time
of injury he was earning $18.48 per week, but due to unemployment
his average weekly wage for the year preceding the injury was only
$1.67 per week. The Commission awarded him compensation at the
rate of $5 per week, which award was affirmed by the Court below.
1. Section 4445, C. L. 1921, as amended, provides, among other
things, that the injured employee shall receive 50% of his average weekly
wages so long as the disability is total, not to exceed a maximum of
$14 per week, and not less than a minimum of $5 per week,
unless the employee's wages shall be less than $5 per week, in which
event, he shall receive compensation equal to his average weekly wages.
2. The clause "unless the employee's wages shall be less than
$5 per week" means wages at the time of the accident and not average
weekly wages.
3. The word "wages" means the money rate which employee
was actually earning at the time of the accident and where this money
rate was not less than $5, but his average weekly wages for the
year were $1.87, the employee was entitled to an allowance of the
minimum of $5 per week.--Judgment alfirmed.
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE
Chairman Schaetzel requests:
"Will you please put an item in an early edition of the DICTA
asking the attorneys to be sure to sign their names as such in all matters
in which they appear, such as foreclosures through the Public Trustee,
appearances before the Industrial, Public Utilities and Banking Commis-
sions, also on all incorporations filed with the Secretary of State.
"Our Unauthorized Practice of the Law Committee is making a
check of the activities of laymen before all boards, commissions, and the
Public Trustee and the Secretary of State's office. A check is now being
made of the Public Trustee's office, and from cursory examination, less
than twenty per cent of the total number of foreclosures have lawyers'
names attached to the proceedings. It makes it much more difficult for
our committee to investigate any unlawful practice* when the attorneys'
names are not connected with the proceedings."
*J. P. courts excepted, Jake.
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CODE OF LAWS, U. S. A.
By F. D. STACKHOUSE, Clerk, District Court
The Library of the District Court is today in receipt of a "Code
of Laws of the United States of America, in force as of January 3,
1935."
This makes a volume of more than 3,000 pages and we are in-
debted to Congressman Lawrence Lewis for his thoughtfulness in
sending this book for our library. Very truly yours,
F. D. STACKHOUSE, Clerk, District Court.
"DID YOU KNOW"
A Denver ordinance prohibits distribution of handbills which will
probably be thrown in the street and "frighten or injure or endanger
horses or other animals." Very truly yours,
This ordinance is more honored in
judging from the looks of my yard and
week.-Ye Ed.
CARLE WHITEHEAD.
the breach than observance,
porch several mornings each
WE RECOMMEND
The Ames Lumber "PARK-RITE"
Company PARKING
Lumber - Coal - Paint Lawyers and visitors given special at-
Building Hardware tention. Your cars protected. Cor-
Prompt Delivery teous service. Always welcome.
2506 W. Colfax Ave. KEystone 3421 1327 Stout St. Denver, Colorado
MAin 9791
Holiday Greetings
ALLEN REDEKER & COMPANY
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT
University Building KEystone 4784 Denver, Colorado
Central Business College 1450 Tremont Place
For competent office workers, experienced or expertly-trained beginners, call
MAin 3094. There is no charge to Employer or Employee.
A WORD TO THOSE ALREADY EMPLOYED--Our night school courses are
especially adapted to the needs of each student. Our rates are the lowest.




Lue Truly Modern Fuel
Ask our engineers for an estimate on the moderate
cost of heating your home with gas. Then arrange
for immediate installation, that you may enioy
complete freedom from ALL heating worries this
twinter. Thousands of OTHER homes enjoy the
advantages of GAS HEAT-why not YOUR home?





Trustee under Corporate Mortgages
Depository for Protective Committees . . .
Transfer Agent and Registrar for Corporate
Stock . Miscellaneous Fiscal Agencies.
Services to Individuals and Families
Executor and Administrator of Estates
Trustee under Wills . . . Trustee of Living
* Trusts and Life Insurance Trusts . . . Safe-
keeping of Securities.
Escrows
BUSINESS SERVICE FOR BUSINESS MEN
AND WOMEN AND THEIR COUNSEL.
THE AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK
THE DENVER NATIONAL BANK
THE COLORADO NATIONAL BANK
THE INTERNATIONAL TRUST COMPANY
THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL BANK
Each of the above banks are
Members of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
II.
